Overview
My primary research focus is on theories of mental representation and the challenge to these theories from 4E (embodied, embedded, extended and enactive) approaches to cognition. Additionally, I’m interested in the impact of this debate on the philosophies of perception, memory and belief. Below you can find some recent publications and other works in progress.
Publications
Nirshberg, G., (forthcoming). Structural Resemblance and the Causal Role of Content. Erkenntnis.
Some proponents of structural representations (henceforth, structuralists) claim that no other theory of representation can legitimatize the explanatory appeals that cognitive science makes to mental content. Because other naturalistic approaches to representation purportedly posit an arbitrary relation between representing vehicles and representational content, these approaches must appeal to the role played by a representation, i.e., how it is used by the system in which it is embedded, to ground its content. This is in supposed contrast to structural representations, in which the relation of resemblance results in a non-arbitrary relationship between vehicles and content. Structuralists argue that, as a result, approaches that posit structural representations can, and alternative approaches cannot, explain how representational content can be causally relevant in the production of behavior. In this paper, I will argue that structural representations are susceptible to the very same critiques that proponents level against what they sometimes refer to as “use” theories. This, I contend, is not surprising given that a theory of structural representations is, in fact, just as much a use-theory as alternative approaches.
Nirshberg, G., Shapiro, L. (2020). Structural and indicator representations: a difference in degree, not kind. Synthese.
Some philosophers have offered structural representations as an alternative to indicator-based representations. Motivating these philosophers is the belief that an indication-based analysis of representation exhibits two fatal inadequacies from which structural representations are spared: such an analysis cannot account for the causal role of representational content and cannot explain how representational content can be made determinate. In fact, we argue, indicator and structural representations are on a par with respect to these two problems. This should not be surprising, we contend, given that the distinction between indicator and structural representations is better conceived as one involving degree rather than kind.
Masrour, Farid; Nirshberg, Gregory; Schon, Michael; Leardi, Jason & Barrett, Emily (2015). Revisiting the empirical case against perceptual modularity. _Frontiers in Psychology_ 6.
Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations of the perceiver. Proponents of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own, could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who deny the encapsulation thesis.
Under Review
A paper on the nature of the reading process
I present a parity argument which aims to establish that reading is a process for which any sense modality can serve as a candidate input mechanism. I then move to establish that any properties purportedly possessed by visual and tactile (e.g., Braille) reading, but lacked by auditory reading, fail to mark a relevant difference between these forms of reading.
Works in Progress
“Radical Consumerism: Use is all you need (for mental content)”
Consumer system approaches to mental content put significant emphasis on how a state or structure is “used” to determine its content or its status as a representation. In this paper I aim to establish two things. First, that all naturalistic approaches to representation must incorporate a use condition. Second, this use condition, when properly explicated, is sufficient for representation, as it screens off any other purported necessary conditions for mental content.
A paper on function and teleology
There are two broad approaches to function ascription. Etiological approaches explicate function via appeal to the selection history of an item. In contrast, functional analysis approaches appeal to an item’s current causal contribution to some capacity of the system in which it is embedded. I offer an account of function focusing on the dependency relations that obtain between components of a system, one which can accommodate the main insights of prominent approaches, while avoiding their pitfalls.